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LABoR LAw- LABoR-MANAGEMENT Rm.AnoNs Aar-A'ITEMPT TO lNSTITUTE CONSUMER BoYCOTT AS UNFAIR LABoR PRACTICE-In attempting to
induce certain employees of defendant, a manufacturer of bakery products, to
join a bakery workers' union, the union and several labor councils picketed
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retail stores selling defendant's goods in Los Angeles. Placards carried by the
pickets stated that defendant was non-union and on the 'We-do-not-patronize"
list of various labor organizations. A California state court granted defendant
a preliminary injunction against the picketing.1 Thereupon the National Labor
Relations Board applied to federal district court for a preliminary injunction
restraining defendant from invoking the injunction granted by the state court,
claiming that since the unions' conduct was an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(4)(A) of the amended National Labor Relations Act,2 the state
court was without jurisdiction. On appeal from an order of the district court
granting the injunction requested by the NLRB,8 held, affirmed. In their
attempt to institute a consumer boycott of defendant by picketing its products
at the retail level, the un.ions committed an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(l)(A)4 [rather than section 8(b)(4)(A)] of the amended NLRA.
Capital Service, Inc. 11. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 848.
A union's attempt by picketing or other means to induce the general public
to boycott an employer is clearly not within the scope of section 8(b)(4)(A)
since that section by its terms applies only where the union's efforts are directed
toward "employees of an employer."5 In deciding whether the unions' conduct
violated section 8(b)(l)(A) the court reached the general conclusion that
"under 8(b)(I) boycotts are not legal where, as here used to restrain or coerce
employees."6 No distinction was drawn between picketing defendant's own
establishment and picketing retailers handling defendant's products, or between
picketing and any other means of attempting to create a boycott. Nor was any
question raised as to whether defendant threatened union standards by paying
less than union wages or by maintaining substandard working conditions. These
factors are significant under the various common law principles employed in
judging a boycott's legality.7 Was section 8(b)(l)(A) intended to sweep
away all these considerations and outlaw the inducement of public boycotts
for organizational purposes under any and all circumstances? The legislative
history of the LMRA is inconclusive on this point.8 Adhering to the decision
1 Capital Service, Inc. v. Bakery Drivers Local Union No. 276, 21 CCH Lab. Cas.
1[66,865 (1952).
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1952) §l58(b)(4)(A). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment •.•" to perform
services, where such action is taken for certain unlawful objectives, one of which is "forcing
. . . any employer .•• to cease doing business with any other person."
s NLRB v. Capital Service, Inc., (D.C. Cal. 1952) 21 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[67,010.
4 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(b)(l)(A). Sec. 8(b)
provides: ''It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-Cl) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7••••"
Sec. 7 gives employees the right, inter alia, to refrain from self-organization.
5 See note 2 supra; Crowley's Milk Co., Inc. (Paterson Division), 102 N.L.R.B. No.
102 (1953).
6 Principal case at 853.
71 TELLER, LABon DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING §149 (1940); 27 CoL.
L. REv. 190 (1927).
s 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 109 (1952).
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in Perry Norvell Co.9 that section 8(b)(l)(A) was aimed primarily at coercive
.conduct accompanying a strike, not at the strike itself, the NLRB has upheld
the legality of peaceful stranger picketing for organizational purposes.10 However, subsequent cases indicate some relaxation by the Board of this restrictive
interpretation.11 The court in the principal case rested its decision almost
entirely on the proposition that section 8(b)(l) should be given the same scope
.as its counterpart, section 8(a)(l), which forbids employer restraint or coercion
of employees. But a court might well require a more specific indication of
legislative intent to deprive unions of such important means of safeguarding
satisfactory working conditions and increasing union membership. This is
especially so in view of the more limited prohibitions of section 8(b)(4)(C),12
and the fact that organizational methods like those involved in the instant case
have been accepted by some courts as legitimate.13 In focusing its attention
on section 8(b)(l), the court in this case did not consider two important points:
the constitutional question inherent in its restriction upon picketing and free
speech, and the protection given the expression of opinion by section 8(c).14
"'Whether peaceful organizational picketing may be an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech is not entirely settled. Recent Supreme Court
cases15 suggest the possibility that, with respect to section 8(b)(l), the inquiry
would be whether Congress had some rational basis for outlawing this type
of picketing, if it did intend to do so.16 In construing section 8(c), the NLRB
has indicated that it does not protect picketing which falls outside the sphere
of constitutionally secured free speech,17 and that it does not protect any
9 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
10 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948).
11 Clara-Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949); Pinkerton's National

Detective
Agency, 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950). In Jarka Corp. of Philadelphia, 94 N.L.R.B. 320
(1951), the Board found unfair labor practices under §§8(b)(2) and 8(b)(l)(A), but
the court of appeals reversed as to the latter, declining to consider the section's applicability.
NLRB v. Jarka Corp. of Philadelphia, (3d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 618.
12 Does not this section, by specifically outlawing certain types of secondary action to
secure recognition when a rival union has been certified, suggest that Congress did not
intend to prohibit milder forms of recognition and organizational activities'? See Perry
Norvell Co., note 9 supra, at 239.
1s See, e.g., Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937); C. S.
Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. (2d) 389, 106 P. (2d) 414 (1940).
14 "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 61 Stat. L. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. •
(Supp. V, 1952) §158(c).
15 Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke,
and Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Local Union No. 882 v. Cline, 339 U.S. 470,
70 S.Ct. 773 (1950).
16 As expressed in the Hanke case, note 15 supra, at 479, the question is whether
Congress ''has struck a balance so inconsistent witli rooted traditions of a free people that
it must be found an unconstitutional choice." There would appear to be very little doubt
that the courts would sustain Congress' choice in this instance.
17 Denver Building Trade and Construction Trades Council (Henry Shore), 90
N.L.R.B. 1768 (1950).
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form of speech whereby the union is successful in causing an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of section 8(a)(3).18 This
suggests that section 8(c)'s applicability to cases like the present one should
probably depend upon whether it is picketing or some other means that is
used in creating the boycott, and, possibly, upon the degree of success of the
boycott. In the principal case the court disapproved not only of picketing
but of any means of promoting a public boycott, e.g., by using newspaper
advertisements. Furthermore, the opinion gives no indication of whether the
boycott proved at all successful. The court thus appears to have overlooked
some highly significant factors. Perhaps the rather indirect manner in which
the question of section 8(b)(l)(A)'s applicability arose explains why the court
did not give full consideration to all the issues involved. Had it done so it
might well have reached the opposite result.

George B. Berridge, S.Ed.

18 Sec. S(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) •••."
61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(b)(2). Sec. 8(a)(3) forbids
employer discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership. See Sub Grade
Engineering Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 406 (1951).

